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We examine the implications of high degrees of dollarization for the choice of exchange
rate regime and the information content of various monetary aggregates in developing
countries. We conclude that a high degree of currency substitution argues for a more fixed
exchange rate regime, while asset substitution may imply that either more rigid or more
flexible regimes may be appropriate. We also ask whether the most informative monetary
aggregates include dollar assets. Based on an analysis of five countries, we conclude inter
alia that broader aggregates that include dollar assets perform better than those that do not.
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I. Introduction
Dollarization, defined as the holding by residents of foreign currency and
foreign currency-denominated deposits at domestic banks, has risen in recent
years in many developing countries, notably in Latin America but also in
some of the transition economies and in economies as diverse as the
* We would like to thank Zhaohui Chen and Miguel Savastano for useful discussions and
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Network of the U.S. Treasury for providing data on aggregate flows of dollar cash, Tomas
Baliño, Guillermo Calvo, Neil Ericsson, and Soledad Martinez Peria for helpful comments,
and Qiming Chen and Nada Mora for superb research assistance.286 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Philippines, Turkey, and Vietnam.1 This paper analyzes two important issues
posed by this phenomenon. First, how does dollarization affect the choice of
the most appropriate exchange rate regime, in particular the choice between
fixed and flexible rates? Second, supposing a flexible exchange rate regime,
what is the implication of dollarization for the behavior of monetary aggregates;
in particular, are aggregates that include dollar-denominated assets more
informative indicators of future inflation?2
Historically, dollarization has been a response to economic instability and
high inflation. In conditions of hyperinflation, in particular, the public typically
turns to use a stronger currency to the extent possible. But, remarkably, the
increase in dollarization in Latin American countries has continued, in fact
accelerated, after those countries achieved substantial inflation control and
exchange rate stability over the course of the last decade. Some authors have
pointed to ratchet effects in explaining this development (see Guidotti and
Rodríguez, 1992).3 Some data also suggest that the increase in local holdings
of dollar assets resulted from the return of capital held by residents abroad as
part of the surge in capital flows to developing countries in the 1990s.4
It is useful to distinguish between two motives for the demand for foreign
currency assets: currency substitution and asset substitution5. Currency
1 The term “dollarization” has also come to mean the establishment of a foreign currency
such as the dollar as legal tender in lieu of a distinct domestic currency, as in Panama. That
is not our usage here. Berg and Borensztein (2000) discuss full dollarization, that is the
adoption of a foreign currency as legal tender.
2 Baliño et al. (1999) incorporate some of the results of this paper into a broader discussion
of the policy implications of partial dollarization.
3 Kamin and Ericsson (1993) estimate a money demand with “ratchet” effects for Argentina
for a period that includes a hyperinflation episode.
4 Baliño et al. (1999) discusses and interprets these trends. Calvo and Végh (1992, 1996)
and Savastano (1992, 1996) also mention capital flows as a driving factor for dollarization.
5 This distinction is standard in the literature. An early reference is Lamdany and Dorlhiac
(1987). See the useful surveys by Calvo and Végh (1996) and Giovannini and Turtelboom
(1994). McKinnon (1996) terms the two motives direct currency substitution and indirect
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substitution refers to a situation in which foreign assets are used as money
(essentially as means of payment and unit of account) while asset substitution
occurs when foreign currency assets are demanded as financial assets but
without a specific monetary function. Currency substitution typically arises
under conditions of high inflation or hyperinflation when the high cost of
using domestic currency for transactions prompts the public to look for
available alternatives. Once the use of foreign currency in transactions becomes
accepted, however, it may not be rapidly abandoned even after stabilization.
Asset substitution results from risk and return considerations about domestic
and foreign assets. Historically, foreign-currency denominated assets have
provided the opportunity of insuring against macroeconomic risks (price
instability and prolonged depressions) in many developing countries. Even
under conditions of current stability, foreign currency denominated assets
may still serve this purpose if agents believe there is even a small chance of
inflationary relapse.
Section II analyzes, and also qualifies, the case for adopting a fixed
exchange rate under currency substitution. In a simple static stochastic model
that assumes nominal rigidities, the exchange rate regime determines the
relationship between the pattern of shocks facing the economy and the resulting
variance of output, in the spirit of Poole (1970). For example, an economy
facing a preponderance of real shocks would have lower output variance in a
floating exchange rate regime. Currency substitution may alter these
relationships, by changing both the pattern of shocks and the response of the
economy to those shocks in the different regimes. In order to investigate how
this works, we extend a simple static stochastic macro model based on Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1996) to incorporate the phenomenon of currency substitution.
This framework is helpful, but it does not allow us to address many of the
key issues associated with partial dollarization that fit more appropriately
under the heading of asset substitution. Thus, the second part of section II
discusses the implications of asset substitution for exchange rate regime choice,
focussing on the risks that devaluations may pose in a dollarized financial
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Dollarization also raises the issue of the appropriate role of dollar-
denominated monetary assets in the conduct of monetary policy in a floating
exchange rate regime. In a financial programming exercise, for example,
ceilings for domestic credit are based on a specific target for money supply.
This requires a choice of a nominal aggregate as (intermediate) target and
raises the question of whether this target should include dollar-denominated
assets. On the view that money is targeted because it determines the price
level through transactions demand for money, currency substitution implies
that dollar monetary assets are part of the relevant concept of money while
assets substitution implies that they are not. To evaluate this issue, we examine
the role of dollar assets in a reduced form inflation equation.6 Specifically,
we use a vector autoregression methodology to examine the strength and
stability of the relationship between inflation and lagged changes in various
definitions of money in five countries with substantial dollarization. Thus,
section III examines the evidence on the usefulness of different monetary
aggregates in Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, the Philippines, and Turkey. We find
that broad aggregates that include foreign currency deposits are more
informative than those that do not, but our measures of dollar currency
circulating in the country does not help predict price levels.
II. Exchange Rate Regime
In this section, we look at the implications of dollarization for the choice
of exchange rate regime. While the answers are ultimately empirical, an
analytical framework can suggest where to look. To organize ideas, it is
convenient to consider two polar cases: pure currency substitution and pure
asset substitution, covered in subsections A and B below.
6 A number of recent studies, including Estrella and Mishkin (1996), Friedman and Kuttner
(1996), and Feldstein and Stock (1994), have used this type of technique to approach the
analogous question of whether any of the domestic money aggregates (money base, M1 or
M2) might be useful intermediate targets of US monetary policy.289 THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME AND MONETARY TARGET
A. Currency Substitution
Currency substitution will tend to increase exchange rate volatility. The
basic cause is the interaction between money supply and the exchange rate.
In an economy where both domestic and foreign currency serve as money,
changes in the exchange rate have an automatic effect on the money supply:
a devaluation increases the value of foreign currency assets in terms of the
domestic currency, and the overall money supply increases. The result, derived
below, is that the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
currency would be high in this case, which makes the exchange rate more
sensitive to any expected change in the domestic money supply, or other factors
affecting monetary equilibrium. An additional way in which currency
substitution may increase monetary volatility is through the possibility for
shocks in demand for domestic money relative to foreign money.
Although this increase in volatility suggests a case for adopting a fixed
exchange rate under currency substitution,7 this conclusion is not absolute.
The source of shocks still matters (see, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff,
1996). If shocks mostly originate in money markets, fixed exchange rates
provide more stability, but if shocks are mostly real in nature, floating rates
are superior in reducing volatility. This principle still holds true in the case of
an economy with currency substitution.
The case for fixed exchange rates under currency substitution can be
analyzed with the help of a simple model that captures the key effects of
currency substitution and focusses on the effect of the exchange rate regime
on the variance of output. Suppose that, although there is extensive currency
substitution in the economy, practices or institutional restrictions (including
7 This is the generally supported view on currency substitution in the literature. See Girton
and Roper (1981) -who actually propose competition between currencies instead of fixed
rates- Calvo and Végh (1996), and Giovannini and Turtelboom (1994). McKinnon (1996)
justifies his recommendation for an international monetary standard and a world monetary
authority largely on the volatility of exchange rates under currency substitution.292 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
This framework, as shown in the Appendix, yields the following
conclusions. In a floating rate regime, the exchange rate of a dollarized
economy will be more sensitive to expected changes in the money supply,
and to other variables that affect the expected rate of depreciation of the
exchange rate.8 Considering, in addition, that when there is extensive currency
substitution it is likely that monetary shocks will be relatively larger in
magnitude, as unpredictable shifts between domestic and foreign currency
may occur, this would support the desirability of fixing the exchange rate of
a highly dollarized economy. However, the principle that an economy is more
volatile under floating rates if monetary shocks predominate and less volatile
if real shocks predominate still holds in the case of a dollarized economy.
The case for a fixed exchange rate under currency substitution is therefore
not an absolute one.
B. Asset Substitution
Suppose that domestic residents are allowed to open foreign exchange
accounts in domestic banks and that the central bank imposes a 100 percent
reserve requirement on those foreign currency accounts. Suppose domestic
residents bring into the country $1 million and deposit them with domestic
banks. The central bank keeps the foreign currency assets as international
reserves in a foreign bank account. What happens? Essentially nothing.
Domestic residents hold the same foreign currency net asset position as before
and so do the foreign banks. The central bank and the domestic banks have
balanced accounts. Without changes in net positions for any agent, there should
8 As shown in the Appendix, the exchange rate is a function of all the expected future
values of the money supply and random shocks, with a discount factor that depends on the
interest elasticity of money demand. The higher the elasticity, the more sensitive is the
exchange rate to expected future shocks. Note however that, in this model, a high interest
elasticity has the opposite effect for current shocks to the money market: only small changes
in the exchange rate are necessary to generate the adjustment in real money demand necessary
to restore equilibrium.293 THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME AND MONETARY TARGET
be no meaningful effects on financial markets or aggregate demand. Recorded
domestic-currency denominated monetary aggregates should not change, and
it would not make sense for the monetary authorities to attempt to offset the
increase in deposits with domestic banks.
In practice, however, two things may happen. First, the central bank may
not just keep the foreign assets as reserves but would instead use those (gross)
foreign reserves as needed in the foreign exchange market. In fact, this could
have been the motivation to authorize foreign currency deposits in the first
place. Therefore, this capital inflow would either affect the current exchange
rate, or help the (short-term) sustainability of an existing exchange rate peg.
Second, banks will be able to expand lending through either dollar -or
domestic- currency denominated loans. In either case there will be an expansion
in aggregate demand and the money supply, as the loan proceeds are spent in
goods and some of the foreign currency is sold for domestic currency either
by individuals or banks trying to balance their reserves position. (This
expansionary effect will take place even if the original dollar deposits are
“not money” in the sense of not performing any transactions or liquidity
functions for the deposit holders.)
These considerations suggest that dollarization in the form of asset
substitutability does not have special implications for monetary policy and
exchange rate.9 Dollarization implies a situation akin to high capital mobility,
with low transaction costs to move from foreign-currency to domestic-currency
assets, and presumably higher sensitivity to interest differentials. But the basic
conditions under which the choice of exchange rate regime is made would
only change to the extent that the higher degree capital mobility and
substitutability would make sterilization more difficult or costly.
The most important implications of dollarization in the form of asset
substitution for the choice of exchange rate regime may arise from likely
increases in foreign exchange risks in the financial markets. When banks
expand their assets and liabilities in foreign and domestic currency, they are
9 This is the same conclusion that Cuddington (1983).294 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
likely to become more vulnerable to exchange rate changes or volatile dollar
deposits. Defaults on foreign-currency denominated loans would increase in
the event of an exchange rate depreciation, leaving banks (and ultimately, the
central bank) in a weakened financial position. In addition, maturity
mismatches between bank assets and liabilities in foreign currency would
make the banks more vulnerable to volatile dollar deposits.10 Moreover, capital
inflows mediated through the banking system, such as those described above,
expand gross reserves with as short run liabilities, in the form of the increase
in required reserves of banks. The monetary authorities may use the increase
in foreign reserves to support a misaligned exchange rate while increasing
short-run liabilities.
The vulnerability of the financial system to exchange rate changes may
imply that exchange rate flexibility must be ruled out as a policy tool with
which to respond to shocks.11 Moreover, fixed but adjustable regimes may
represent the worst of both worlds, in that they may encourage market
participants to assume exchange rate risk based on a (mistaken) confidence
in the fixity of the exchange rate. The eventual devaluation would then be
particularly costly.12 For highly dollarized countries, which ultimately cannot
hedge fully against exchange rate risk, a hard peg such as a currency board or
even full dollarization may be appropriate.13
III. Selecting a Money Target
In a floating exchange rate regime, a monetary aggregate may play the
role of nominal anchor for monetary policy, perhaps on the grounds that it
10 See Detragiache (1999).
11 This argument has been made forcefully in Calvo (1999).
12 Krugman (1998), inter alia, has analyzed the Asian crises of 1997/1998 somewhat along
these lines.
13 Hausmann et al. (1999) argue this case.295 THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME AND MONETARY TARGET
determines the price level through transactions demand for money.14
Dollarization raises the question of what monetary aggregate the central bank
should consider.15 In the frameworks presented in section II, introduction,
currency substitution implies that dollar monetary assets are part of the relevant
concept of money while assets substitution implies that they are not.
Unfortunately, the empirical literature has shed little light on the distinction
between currency substitution and asset substitution in this context. Most
work has implicitly or explicitly assumed away assets substitution in testing
for currency substitution.16 The traditional approach has been to attempt to
identify currency substitution from the coefficients on the rate of return
variables included in money demand functions. Specifically, studies added a
variable measuring expected exchange rate depreciation to the usual
determinants of domestic money demand and interpreted this variable as
measuring the opportunity cost of holding domestic vs foreign currency.17 As
Cuddington (1983) pointed out, however, domestic money demand will depend
on the rate of exchange rate depreciation even in the absence of currency
substitution, because the rate of depreciation affects the yield of foreign assets,
which is an opportunity cost to domestic money. Thus, a test to distinguish
between currency and asset substitution would include both the rate of return
on foreign bonds in domestic currency and the rate of depreciation itself in
the money demand regression, with a negative and significant coefficient on
the rate of depreciation variable suggesting currency substitution as distinct
from asset substitution. Unfortunately, these two rates of return variables are
closely correlated, particularly in countries likely to have currency substitution,
and their independent effects are essentially impossible to distinguish.
14 In IMF financial programming, monetary aggregates formally play such a role, though
the practice is more flexible. See Mussa and Savastano (1999) for a complete discussion.
15 Of course, it is not clear that it is advisable to pay much attention to any monetary
aggregate at all. We return to this issue below and in the conclusion.
16 See Savastano (1996) for a useful review of this literature.
17 See, for example, Miles (1978) and Bordo and Choudri (1982).296 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
In this light, a potentially more fruitful approach would start not with money
demand but with the determinants of inflation. Although money demand
functions look quite similar to asset demand functions, and the explanatory
variables that may distinguish between the two are highly correlated, it is the
stock of money, but presumably not of assets, that is closely correlated with the
volume of transactions and the rate of inflation. From this point of view, the
relevant test of currency substitution is whether foreign monetary assets belong
in the monetary aggregate that predicts inflation in the most reliable way.
This line of analysis might suggest the estimation of structural inflation
equations and examine the role of various monetary aggregates in the inflation
equation.18 We proceed less ambitiously but more directly here, examining
the role of dollar assets in a reduced form inflation equation.19 Specifically,
we use a vector autoregression methodology to examine the strength and
stability of the relationship between inflation and lagged changes in various
definitions of money in five countries with substantial dollarization. This in
turn depends, in part, on which aggregate has the most stable relationship to
target variables such as inflation and output.
Before pursuing this question, we emphasize that the question of the
usefulness of money targeting per se is beyond the scope of this paper. It is
worth remembering, though, that it has proven difficult even in comparatively
stable and non-dollarized industrial countries to find a clear role for targets
on monetary aggregates in the conduct of monetary policy. Thus, since the
1980s, monetary targeting has become less and less common even in these
countries.  Friedman and Kuttner (1996) provide evidence that the U.S. Federal
18  See, for example, Juselius (1992) for Denmark, Metin (1995) for Turkey, and De Brouwer
and Ericsson (1995) for Australia.  These papers tend not to find an important role for
monetary aggregates in explaining inflation, instead pointing to various other factors, such
as labor market disequilibria and deviations from PPP.
19 A number of recent studies, including Estrella and Mishkin (1996), Friedman and Kuttner
(1996), and Feldstein and Stock (1994), have used this type of technique to approach the
analogous question of whether any of the domestic money aggregates (money base, M1 or
M2) might be useful intermediate targets of US monetary policy.297 THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME AND MONETARY TARGET
Reserve Board did indeed target monetary aggregates for several years after
1979, but that practice stopped in the mid-1980s, roughly when monetary
aggregates ceased having predictive value for future inflation and income.
Estrella and Mishkin (1996) also find that the relationship between monetary
aggregates and final target variables has been unstable and in particular that
there was no causality from monetary aggregates to final targets in the 1980s,
both in Germany and the United States. They argue that this suggests that
monetary aggregates provide little information about future values of final
targets, so that intermediate targets on monetary aggregates are unlikely to be
useful. Feldstein and Stock (1994), in contrast, find some evidence of a weak
but, they argue, usable relationship between M2 and nominal GDP.20
To investigate the relevance of foreign currency deposits and other dollar
assets, our strategy is to run a quarterly VAR on prices, a money aggregate,
and in some cases the exchange rate for each of five partially dollarized
countries. For each of the economies considered, we compare the results for
the price equation with different money aggregates along three dimensions.
First, if a given aggregate does not Granger cause prices, then it is unlikely to
be a good intermediate target.21 Second, a gauge of the relative information
content in the various aggregates is the R2 statistic for the price equation,
which measures how well an equation with that particular aggregate accounts
for the variance in prices. Third, an aggregate is more useful if its relationship
to prices is stable across time. Thus, we examine the price equation for stability
using Chow break-point tests.22
20 Hendry and Ericsson (1991) among others have found stable money demand functions
in these countries.  However, they also find that there is little evidence of feedback from
deviations in long-run equilibrium in the money market to prices or other variables.  They
therefore also conclude that targeting of monetary aggregates would not achieve desired
targets for final objective variables.
21 Even this seemingly weak claim may not hold.  If, for example, the monetary authorities
conducted activist counter cyclical policy with the aggregate in question as intermediate
target in the sample, then this would eliminate measured Granger causality.
22 The actual test employed is the breakpoint F-test as described in PC-Give 9.0 (See Hendry298 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
We consider three types of dollar assets: foreign-currency deposits at the
domestic banking system (FCD), cross-border deposits held at banks abroad
(CBD), and dollar currency in circulation within the domestic economy (DCC).
Reliable information is available only for the first category, and most existing
studies are based on this measure. The best source of data on CBD are the
statistics published by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which
compiles data on deposits held by nonresidents at all reporting institutions
classified by the country of nationality of the depositor. It is likely that CBD are
highly underestimated, however, because of the legal and tax-related
ramifications of cross-border deposits. For example, residents of one country
can transfer assets to a company they set up in a third country, which appears
to be the holder of the deposit.23 Nevertheless, one would expect that the broad
trends in the evolution of the BIS measure of CBD are similar to those followed
by a more accurate measure. Moreover, the bias has probably been decreasing
in recent years because of the tendency to lessen exchange controls in various
developing countries. No statistics on DCC exist; a measure of flows of U.S.
currency to and from other countries can be constructed, however, from U.S.
Customs Service data on shipments of currency across the U.S. border.
Although this measure has a number of shortcomings, discussed below, it
nevertheless provides some indication of the evolution of dollar currency
holdings.24
These three dollar aggregates plus the usual domestic suspects yield seven
and Doornik (1996). This tests, at each point t, for a structural break in the estimated
equation between the first t observations and the remaining observations. For each t, the
model is estimated over the first t observations (as long as t is large enough to permit
estimation). Forecasts are then generated for the remaining T - t + 1 observations. A typical
statistics is calculated as [(RSST - RSSt-1)(t - k - 1)] / [RSSt-1(T - t + 1)] and is assumed to
be distributed as F(T - t + 1, t - k - 1).
23 For example, the three top countries of residence of nonbank depositors in the Western
Hemisphere are Cayman Islands, Panama, and the Netherlands Antilles.
24 Baliño et al. (1999) discuss the sources and styled facts for these data in much greater
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candidate monetary aggregates. Four exclude estimates of US dollar cash in
circulation: base money (MB), currency-in-circulation (CC), M1 (CC plus
sight deposits), M2 (M1 plus domestic-currency time deposits), M3 (M2 plus
FCD), and in some cases M4 (M3 plus CBD). In addition, where data are
available we construct estimates of US dollar cash in circulation (DCC) from
Baliño et al. (1999). To this end, we follow the admittedly crude approximation
of assuming there was no dollar cash in circulation at the end of 1988, and
that the stock in circulation subsequently is equal to the cumulative net flow
based on the customs data. This yields three additional aggregates: M1 plus
DCC (M1_us), M3 plus DCC (M3_us), and M4 plus DCC (M4_us).
For each country, we estimate bivariate VARs in money and prices, as
well as trivariate VARs including the exchange rate. In light of the short time
series available, we take an eclectic approach with regard to cointegration.
First, we estimate these regressions in first differences, supposing that there
is no cointegration.25 Where we could not reject cointegration of money and
prices using a Johansen test, we also add an error correction term to the
difference regression, calculated from the cointegrating vector derived from
the Johansen procedure. In the trivariate regressions, for those cases where
the hypothesis of one cointegrating vector cannot be rejected but two or more
can be, we are generally able to plausibly identify the cointegrating vector as
comprising money and prices. Where there are two, it is usually plausible to
identify the two vectors as a money demand equation and a PPP-type relation
between the exchange rate and prices. In these cases, both error correction
terms are included in the VARs.26
25 The results of augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root tests suggest that
for most countries, prices, money and the exchange rate are I1, though there was some
evidence of I2 prices.
26 The estimated cointegrating vectors generally look like simple money demand equations,
in that (with the coefficient on money normalized to 1) the coefficient on prices is close to,
though usually significantly lower than, -1. In the trivariate regressions, the two cointegrating
vectors can be tentatively identified as a money demand equation with coefficients as in
the bivariate cases, and as a PPP-equation, with roughly equal and opposite coefficients on
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Figure 1. Breakpoint Chow Tests of Inflation Equation
Notes:   The  test  employed  is the breakpoint F-test (see text footnote 22).  This tests, at each point t, for a structural break in the
estimated equation between the first t observations and the remaining observations.  The graphs show the resulting statistic (calculated
as [(RSST - RSSt-1)(t-k-1)]/[RSSt-1(T-t+1)] and assumed to be distributed as F(T-t+1, t-k-1)).  The horizontal line represents the 1 percent
significance level for this statistic.302 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
The following is an analysis of the results by country. The results for Peru
(Table 1) support three conclusions. First, M3 appears to have a stronger
relationship to prices than does M2. That is, the inclusion of foreign currency
deposits in the broad money aggregate seems to strengthen its explanatory
power. The results from the Granger causality tests are the most revealing
here, as the R-squared statistics, while consistent with these results, are very
similar across the different regressions. In the full sample, neither M2 nor M3
Granger cause inflation, though M3 is slightly more promising. For example,
only M3 appears to be cointegrated with prices in the bivariate VARs. But
there is strong evidence for structural breaks in the price equations with all
the aggregates in 1990, when Peru stabilized a hyperinflation and changed its
exchange rate regime. In the more recent sub-sample, M3 performs clearly
better than M2, as M3 Granger causing prices but M2 does not. In the trivariate
VARs, M3 is the only aggregate that Granger causes inflation.
Second, the inclusion of measures of U.S. dollar cash in circulation does
not generally improve the performance of monetary aggregates. (Data are
only available for the more recent subperiod.)  In one case, with M3 in the
trivariate VAR, the inclusion of U.S. dollar cash in circulation eliminates the
Granger causality.
regime changes. Since the estimated equations are in reduced form, the interpretation of
these dummies is problematic. However, since they improve the fit of the equations, they
may provide a fairer test for the power of money to predict prices during periods of broad
stability, at a cost of weakening the test of the ability of aggregates to predict prices across
major regime changes. For Argentina, one dummy captures the effects of Plan Bonex
stabilization in the second and third quarters of 1989, while the second captures the change
in the exchange rate regime from the end of 1989. Two Bolivian dummies capture the
effects of suspension of FCD convertibility from 1983 to 1986 and the stabilization plan in
1985. For Peru (full sample), one dummy captures the suspension of FCD convertibility
between 1985 and 1988, while another captures the change in monetary policy and exchange
rate regime since 1990. One Turkey dummy captures the effects of the exchange rate crisis
in 1994. There were no dummies for the Philippines.
30 The Schwartz criterion determined the lag length for the VARs. Each equation for a
































































Granger Causality3 0.0345* 0.0937 0.0553 0.7378 0.3443 0.4678
R-squared4 0.782 0.776 0.78 0.77 0.772 0.771
With error correction term5
Granger Causality --- 0.0198* 0.0726 --- 0.4432 ---
R-squared 0.791 0.784 0.774
Trivariate6
No cointegration
Granger Causality3 0.0488* 0.1022 0.0688 0.6886 0.4217 0.759
R-squared4 0.783 0.779 0.781 0.772 0.774 0.772
With error correction term5
Granger Causality 0.0126* 0.0459* 0.0030** 0.0954 0.0873 0.1838
R-squared 0.841 0.834 0.844 0.83 0.833 0.83
Stability7 Strong evidence of a break in the inflation equation at the end of 1990 for all



































Granger Causality 0.0002** 0.0247* 0.0012** 0.0120* 0.0674 0.0000** 0.0051** 0.0000** 0.0042**
R-squared 0.947 0.927 0.942 0.931 0.921 0.961 0.935 0.955 0.936
Trivariate
No cointegration
Granger Causality 0.8474 0.9622 0.8709 0.6849 0.7665 0.0445* 0.2997 0.4122 0.4915
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.968 0.963 0.962 0.961
Table 1.  (Continue) Peru
Monetary Aggregate1
MB CC M1 M1_US M2 M3 M3_US M4 M4_US
Notes: 1 Money aggregate definitions:
MB: base money; CC: domestic currency  in circulation; M1: CC plus sight deposits.
M2: M1 plus domestic currency time deposits; M3: M2 plus foreign currency deposits; M4: M3 plus cross-border deposits.
M1_US, M2_US, M3_US: domestic aggregate plus dollar cash in circulation.
2 Quarterly VAR with money and prices
3 Statistic shown is p-value of hypothesis that no lags of the money variable belong in the price equation.
* implies significance at the 5 percent level, ** at the 1 percent level.
4 The R2 for the price equation in the VAR.
5 Where there is evidence of cointegration, the estimated cointegrating vector (lagged once) is added to the differenced regression.
The Granger causality test includes a zero restriction on the lagged cointegrating vector.
6 Quarterly VAR with money, prices and the nominal exchange rate (against the US dollar).
7 Breakpoint F-tests are conducted at each quarter after initial period. See footnote 22 of text and Figure 1 for selected results.305 THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME AND MONETARY TARGET
Third, the evidence is mixed regarding the comparison of M3 with the
narrow aggregates. In the full-sample VARs, base money and currency-in-
circulation appear to perform better. In the full-sample bivariate VAR in
differences, only base money, among all the aggregates, Granger causes
inflation. Where there is evidence of cointegration, only currency-in-circulation
Granger causes inflation. In the trivariate VARs, all the aggregates appear to
be cointegrated with prices, but only the three narrower aggregates Granger
cause inflation. As mentioned above, there is strong evidence of a structural
break in 1990, and in the more recent sub-sample, there is some evidence that
M3 is the best predictor of inflation.
The results for Argentina (Table 2) yield two broad conclusions. First, M2
tends to be inferior to broader aggregates, particularly those that include FCDs,
and in some cases dollar cash in circulation and Argentinean deposits abroad.
In the full sample, M4 Granger causes inflation, while M2 and M3 do not.
Moreover, the only stable bivariate price equation includes M4; the others
appear to have a break in 1990. Remarkably, all the trivariate price equations
appear stable throughout the estimating period. For the most recent sub-sample,
M3 Granger causes inflation with a p-value of .06, while the broader aggregates
(and M2) are much less significant. The differences in the R-squared statistics
are in the same direction but much smaller. Second, the inclusion of dollar
cash in circulation does not substantially improves the performance of
monetary aggregates for Argentina. It is not possible from these results to
conclude whether the broader aggregates are better than the narrowest
aggregates at predicting inflation. For both samples, the narrower aggregates,
particularly base money, also tend to Granger cause inflation in both samples.
They tend to have slightly higher R-squared statistics.
Two clear conclusions emerge for Turkey (Table 3). First, while all the
aggregates Granger cause inflation, the addition of foreign currency deposits
to M2 strengthens the relationship between the monetary aggregates in
inflation. Removing the time deposits from M2 also strengthens the






































Granger Causality3 0.0009** 0.1188 0.1041 0.457 0.2768 0.0000**
R-squared4 0.725 0.68 0.682 0.665 0.671 0.903
With error correction term5
Granger Causality --- --- --- --- --- ---
R-squared --- --- --- --- --- ---
Trivariate6
No cointegration
Granger Causality3 0.0084** 0.552 0.878 0.896 0.966 0.687
R-squared4 0.916 0.903 0.901 0.901 0.901 0.915
With error correction term5
Granger Causality 0.0124* 0.2547 0.2972 0.3102 0.8068 0.2131

























































Stability7 The Breakpoint Chow test detects a break in the inflation equation in 1990 for all
monetary aggregates except M4 which has a stable relationship with inflation.  All





Granger Causality 0.0319* 0.0823 0.0461* 0.25 0.2134 0.0636 0.7356 0.7172 0.2604
R-squared 0.827 0.814 0.822 0.797 0.799 0.818 0.782 0.782 0.796
Notes: See Table 1 for notes.
Table 2. (Continue) Argentina
Monetary Aggregate1






































Granger Causality3 0.0258* 0.0269* 0.0000** 0.0121* 0.0005**
R-squared4 0.529 0.528 0.695 0.545 0.604
With error correction term5
Granger Causality --- 0.0091**0.0000** 0.0107* 0.0017**
R-squared --- 0.576 0.704 0.572 0.607
Trivariate6
No cointegration
Granger Causality3 0.0277* 0.0305* 0.0000** 0.0104* 0.0003**
R-squared4 0.534 0.531 0.719 0.556 0.623
With error correction term5
Granger Causality --- 0.0018**0.0000** --- 0.0059**

























































Stability7 The inflation equation exhibits a stable relationship with the
monetary aggregates throughout the estimation sample when





Granger Causality 0.0438* 0.0554 0.0002** 0.999 0.0231* 0.0012** 0.875
R-squared 0.732 0.723 0.823 0.629 0.745 0.799 0.635
Trivariate
No cointegration
Granger Causality 0.0461* 0.0985 0.0001** 0.9701 0.0416* 0.0015** 0.8101
R-squared 0.744 0.724 0.844 0.643 0.749 0.814 0.652
Notes: See Table 1 for notes.
Table 3. (Continue) Turkey
Monetary Aggregate1
MB CC M1 M1_US M2 M3 M3_US310 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
than M2. In the bivariate first-difference regressions over the entire sample,
for example, R-squared is 0.55 with M2, 0.60 with M3, and 0.70 with M1.
Second, the addition of dollar cash in circulation greatly weakens the
relationship between monetary aggregate and prices.
The results for Bolivia (Table 4) do not allow us to tell whether foreign
currency deposits should be added to the definition of money; the results for
M2 and M3 are very similar. However, some conclusions are possible. First,
it would appear that CBD should not be included in money. Second, there is
some evidence that the inclusion of dollar cash in circulation strengthens the
relationship of money and prices, though this depends on the specifications.
In particular, dollar cash in circulation helps only when the exchange rate is
excluded from the VAR.
The results for the Philippines (Table 5) also do not shed much light on
the question of whether FCDs should be included in money, as both M2 and
M3 perform much more poorly than narrower aggregates, particularly currency
in circulation. (There are no data on dollar cash in circulation). The price
equation is apparently stable for the entire period, no matter which monetary
aggregate is included.
To summarize, the results vary substantially from country to country and
across sub-samples. Few broad conclusions are possible. We can nonetheless
make three important generalizations about the impact of dollarization. First,
the superiority of a broad aggregate that includes FCD to one that does not
(that is, M3 to M2) appears fairly robust. Second, the inclusion of dollar cash
in circulation does not generally improve the performance of the monetary
aggregate. Finally, it appears that the narrow aggregates appear to do at least
as well as the broader aggregates in most cases.
To interpret the first conclusion, it may help to consider that in general the
demands for each of the monetary assets considered will be subject to random
shocks. An aggregate may be a better predictor of inflation if random shocks
to the demand for that aggregate have smaller variance. In general, broader
aggregates might be better or worse predictors of the objective variable (here
































































Granger Causality3 0.0000** 0.0000**0.0000** 0.0004** 0.0000** 0.2043
R-squared4 0.794 0.8 0.808 0.781 0.796 0.758
With  error correction term5
Granger Causality 0.0000** 0.0000**0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0024**
R-squared 0.786 0.796 0.804 0.766 0.813 0.682
Trivariate6
No cointegration
Granger Causality3 0.0000** 0.0000**0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0177*
R-squared4 0.817 0.814 0.829 0.796 0.806 0.771
With error correction term5
Granger Causality 0.0000** 0.0000**0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0002**
R-squared 0.865 0.866 0.879 0.845 0.878 0.849



































Granger Causality 0.8281 0.1527 0.3019 0.6691 0.8727 0.9943
R-squared 0.182 0.223 0.204 0.185 0.182 0.181
With error correction term5




Granger Causality 0.6893 0.0595 0.0907 0.9051 0.9621 0.7264
R-squared 0.25 0.313 0.301 0.247 0.247 0.249
With error correction term5
Granger Causality --- --- 0.2977 --- 0.0571 ---
R-squared 0.397 0.353
Table 4. (Continue) Bolivia
Monetary Aggregates1





























































Granger Causality 0.6171 0.0347* 0.071 0.0019** 0.8632 0.9053 0.0178* 0.9919 0.0218*
R-squared 0.066 0.199 0.165 0.318 0.057 0.057 0.23 0.056 0.22
Trivariate
No cointegration
Granger Causality 0.7915 0.0066**0.0078** 0.0686 0.3958 0.6029 0.544 0.5586 0.585
R-squared 0.283 0.45 0.445 0.368 0.302 0.289 0.292 0.291 0.29
Notes:  See Table 1 for notes.
Table 4. (Continue) Bolivia
Monetary Aggregates1
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Table 5. Philippines
Monetary Aggregates1





Granger Causality3 0.0484* 0.0232* 0.0230* 0.1281 0.111
R-squared4 0.376 0.402 0.402 0.336 0.342
With error correction term5
Granger Causality 0.0349* 0.0033** --- --- ---
R-squared 0.42 0.492 --- --- ---
Trivariate6
No cointegration
Granger Causality3 0.1329 0.0188* 0.0548 0.054 0.1145
R-squared4 0.594 0.643 0.618 0.618 0.598
With error correction term5
Granger Causality 0.213 0.0001** 0.0032** --- ---
R-squared 0.61 0.759 0.709 --- ---
Stability7 The inflation equation exhibits a stable relationship
to the monetary aggregates throughout the estimation
sample using the Breakpoint Chow test.
Notes:  See Table 1 for notes.
relationship to inflation than the others, then it will perform better in the
above tests. If, on the contrary, the components have similar relationships to
inflation and the shocks are of similar magnitude, then a broader aggregate
will tend to smooth out the shocks and hence perform better. Finally, if the
shocks to the different components of the broader aggregates are negatively
correlated the case for the broader aggregate would be even stronger.31
31 This effect is captured in the model through the error term in equation (2).315 THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME AND MONETARY TARGET
The superiority of both narrower aggregates and M3 to M2 is consistent
with the hypothesis that shifts between domestic and foreign assets are
important and weaken the relationship between an aggregate that includes
just one of these close substitutes (for example, domestic M2) and inflation.
The failure of dollar cash in circulation to improve the performance of
monetary aggregates could be taken to imply that it is predominantly a store
of value, not a means of exchange. Unfortunately, it may well reflect the
substantial measurement error that is undoubtably present in our measure of
dollar currency.32
Several caveats are in order. First, the simple VAR methodology employed,
while it minimized the required assumptions about the structure of the
economy, may give misleading results. A maintained assumption is that the
nature of the relationship between money and inflation is stable and invariant
to changes in the rules for monetary policy. Moreover, important variables
have certainly been omitted, because of data limitations and to keep the analysis
tractable. More generally, country-specific structural analysis of the price
equation would be advisable. Also, the conclusion that M3 would be a better
intermediate target than M2 begs the question of whether the monetary
authorities can control effectively the foreign component of this broader
aggregate. At the least, though, a policy of targeting a domestic aggregate
such as M2 should take into account shifts between aggregates, particularly
assets denominated in foreign and domestic currency, when evaluating the
stance of policy.
IV. Conclusion
The analysis in section II, makes but also qualifies the case for adopting a
fixed exchange rate under currency substitution. A floating exchange rate
32 Kamin and Ericsson (1993) are more successful in using the same measure of dollar
currency in estimating a money demand equation for Argentina. One reason for this
difference may be our concentration on the role of money in the price equation rather than
on the estimation of money demand.316 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
would be highly sensitive to changes in expectations; also, shifts in the demand
for (domestic) money would probably be sizable, resulting in higher volatility.
A floating exchange rate regime may still be preferable, however, even with
currency substitution. If real shocks predominate, for example, a flexible rate
would still permit an easier adjustment.33 Under asset substitution, high capital
mobility with limited effectiveness (or high cost) of sterilization might
recommend a more flexible exchange rate system. On the other hand, highly
dollarized countries that cannot easily hedge exchange rate risk may want to
consider eschewing the option to devalue by choosing a currency board or
even the adoption of the dollar as legal tender.
Section III analyzes the experience of five developing countries and asks
which monetary aggregates seem to have the tightest link to subsequent
inflation, and in particular whether those that include various dollar assets
perform better. We found that while few broad conclusions are possible, we
can nonetheless make three important generalizations about the impact of
dollarization. First, the superiority of a broad aggregate that includes FCD to
one that does not (that is, M3 to M2 in our terminology) appears to be supported
by the data. Second, the inclusion of our measure of dollar cash in circulation
does not generally improve the performance of the monetary aggregate. Finally,
the narrowest aggregates appear to do at least as well as the broader aggregates
in most cases.
We have already stressed above some of the limitations of our approach.
First, with regard to the choice of exchange rate regime we have focussed
mostly on currency substitution, despite the perhaps more important
implications of asset substitution and issues of financial fragility. With regard
to the assessment of the usefulness of the different monetary aggregates,
perhaps the most important shortcoming is that we assume that the authorities
can and should target the money supply so as to hit inflation targets, contrary
33 Another effect in this direction is that the high interest elasticity of money demand implies
that the response of a floating exchange rate to a given current money demand shock
would be smaller, reducing the real effects of not accommodating this shock.322 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
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